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 LAW IN ACTION AND SOCIAL THEORY1
 FOWLER VINCENT HARPER
 I. FUNCTIONAL APPRAISAL OF LAW
 AW in the books may be musty and dry, but law in action
 has to do with life. What is more it has to do with
 social life. Just as physical life depends upon condi-
 tioning to physical environment, so social life depends upon
 conditioning to social environment. "Each of us must fit into
 his physical and human surroundings."' This evolutionary
 process of adaptation to environment,3 may take place on the
 social side in two ways, (I) by adjustments of the mores, i.e.,
 popular customs which comprehend a judgment that they in
 some way make for communal welfare and which exert a
 pressure upon the individual to conform;4 (2) by adjustments
 of a purposive nature when the adaptation is made by means
 of various agencies which affect the conduct of men in their
 relations with each other and with groups. Law, from the
 functional standpoint of the sociologist, is -one of the most
 important and vital agencies for social control. It is through
 law, along with other agencies, that the conduct of persons
 is so regulated that human beings "fit" into the increasingly
 complex social and human surroundings of life, and that a
 certain necessary uniformity in behavior in given directions is
 produced.
 Thus one way to think of law is from the point of view of
 its actual function in the social order, just as we may think of
 religion, custom, and morality as meeting certain vital and
 'The author wishes to acknowledge gratefully his indebtedness to Professor Her-
 man Oliphant, who offered many valuable suggestions during the preparation of this
 article.
 ' Pound, Introduction to Sayre's Cases on Criminal Law (I927), p. XXiX.
 ' Cf. Keller, "Evolution in Law," Yale Law Journal, XXVIII (i9i9), 769, 778.
 'See Sumner, Folkways (I907), pp. 28, 34, 63-64.
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 essential needs of human beings, without which social life
 would be impossible or at least less satisfactory. Law, in this
 sense, will be regarded as a specialized form of control exer-
 cising the systematic pressure of politically organized society.'
 We have, then, to ask how law performs its function as an
 agency for social control. It does so by meeting those needs or
 demands of certain groups of men in society which actually
 gave rise to its origin, in so far as those needs and wants still
 prevail in the social order, and by meeting such additional
 needs or demands as may be thought, from time to time, more
 properly to fall within the effective range of legal action. Thus
 we come to regard law as affording protection for certain so-
 cial interests which somebody wants protected or accident gets
 protected and to such extent as experience and experiment
 demonstrate as appropriate for legal action.
 A great jurist has arranged a scientific scheme of interests
 which the law protects.6 Like any other scientific classification
 of phenomena, it is appropriate and desirable for certain pur-
 poses and inadequate for other purposes. While this scheme
 is arranged in terms of individual interests, public interests,
 and social interests, and although traditional ways of thinking
 have misled men into assuming that individual interests were
 protected for their own sakes, as ends in themselves, law pro-
 tects individual interests only because, and to the extent that,
 they represent certain social interests. These interests, pro-
 tected and safeguarded by law, are not to be thought of as
 pure sociological fiction but are in fact derived from actual
 observation of legal phenomena disclosing what interests the
 law has actually afforded protection for, and disclosing at the
 same time the manner and method of such protection.7
 'Pound, supra., note 2.
 6 See Pound, Introduction to American Law (I92I), pp. 3-4. See his "Theory of
 Social Interests," Publications of the American Sociological Society, IV (I920), I5,
 23 ff.
 'The reader may be referred, for example, to the chapter and section headings of
 the best of the modem casebooks on torts, Bohlen's Cases on Torts (2d ed.; I925):
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 Among the various social interests protection for which is
 continually afforded in many diverse forms in the law is that
 which grows out of the compelling need in any group to be
 secure against those forms of action and courses of conduct
 by individuals which threaten the existence of the group. This,
 perhaps, is the paramount social interest. Wherever its pres-
 sure is felt in law other interests give way, depending on the
 comparative intensity of the conflicting and opposing inter-
 ests. "It is not too much to say that law arose and primitive
 law existed simply to maintain one narrow phase of this inter-
 est, the social interest in peace and order."8
 This, however, has not always appeared as the real state
 of affairs. The culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
 turies helped to disguise juristic thinking as it disguised many
 other types of intellectual endeavor. Preceding this era in the
 common law, jurists had already discovered how to secure this
 paramount social interest in peace and order by allowing rem-
 edies to injured individuals as well as by prosecution in the
 name of the state. With the triumph in the common law of
 natural-law philosophy which, it is not without significance,
 coincided with the development of equity jurisprudence, the
 individual right and the individual conscience became the legal
 as well as the moral guide. As Pound has put it,
 Naturally in that period legal history was written from an individual-
 ist's standpoint and was interpreted as a development of restrictions on
 individual aggressions to assure individual freedom of action. On the con-
 trary, individual freedom of action as an end is something which came into
 juristic thinking in modern times as we began to be conscious of a social
 interest in the individual life. The social interest in the general security
 dictated the very beginnings of law and individual legal rights are but
 "Direct Invasions of the Interest in Bodily Integrity"; "Direct Invasion of the Inter-
 est in Freedom from Apprehension of Either a Harmful or Offensive Bodily Touch-
 ing"; "Direct Invasion of the Interest in Freedom from Confinement"; "Direct In-
 vasion of the Interest in the Exclusive Possessor of Real Property"; "Privilege To
 Intentionally Invade Interests of Personality and Property"; etc.
 8See Pound, "Theory of Social Interest," supra, note 6, at p. 24.
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 means which were gradually worked out in the endeavor to maintain that
 social interest.
 Thus it is that the law apparently creates rights to protect in-
 dividual interests. What it is doing, however, is simply devis-
 ing new means to protect a new social interest-one that has
 arisen in comparatively recent times.
 It is to be observed, then, that if law protects individual
 interests exclusively for the reason that they are involved in
 protection of certain social interests, each individual interest
 should be referable to some corresponding social interest. Here
 it is necessary to examine the implications and bases of this
 sociological appraisal of law to find a theory of society that
 will fit the phenomena which the history of the common law
 reveals.
 II. THE SOCIAL THEORY BEHIND LAW
 We are pretty much committed to the view that no longer
 is there any merit to be derived from conceptions of the state
 which present it as some ideal entity possessing the classic and
 traditional attributes of indivisible and illimitable sovereign-
 ty. This notion, perhaps expedient at one time, seems to have
 outlived its usefulness. More and more we are regarding the
 state from a sociological viewpoint and in the words of an emi-
 nent social scientist, "We are no longer satisfied with the pi-
 ous abstraction that government exists for the 'good of the
 governed' or for the advancement of Christian virtues in the
 community."10 We recognize the state as a composite of va-
 rious groups existing to further various common and related
 interests, and while we need not go so far as Gumplowiez and
 others in concluding that government is merely the agency of
 exploitation of the many by the dominant few,"1 nor yet to the
 benevolent view that the state is exclusively calculated to rec-
 'Ibid., p. 26.
 " Barnes, Sociology and Political Theory (1924), p. 100.
 " Cf. also Oppenheimer, The State (I9I4), p. 25.
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 oncile all conflicting interests,"2 we nevertheless conclude that
 the state with its agency, the government, operating through
 law, marks the regulation and organization of the strife be-
 tween various conflicting interests espoused by their respec-
 tive interest groups. While law may not always succeed in
 completely reconciling and harmonizing all interests, never-
 theless, its primary function is to adjust the conflicts and work
 out the problems of the conflicting groups within as pacific
 and as desirable bounds as possible."3 We are to understand
 that it is no mere accident that the words "adjustment" and
 "justice" have a common root.
 We do not regard the law, then, as a moral science which
 only the elect can master," nor are we longer concerned with
 it as the pure creature of logic, producing a mechanical system
 of abstract rights and duties. Rather we are to emphasize the
 human side of law and recognize that here we have a device
 which society has evolved for purposes of expediency as one
 of the most effective instruments for control. What we ac-
 tually have is primarily groups and interests. Secondarily, of
 course, there are individuals, but it is the group and interest
 aspect or the group-interest that seduces the scientific curi-
 osity. "What we actually find in this world, what we can ob-
 serve and study, is interested men-nothing more and noth-
 ing less. This is our raw material and it is our business to keep
 our eyes fastened to it."'
 The orthodox sociologist in these days conceives of gov-
 ernment as the adjustment of these interests. Only in the leg-
 islature, however, does he see the great battle ground of the
 interest groups, and because the battle there is obvious and
 overt, he thinks it is confined to the legislature. Thus, log-
 See Bristol, Social Adaptation (I9I5), p. 327.
 Bentley, Process of Government (igo8), chaps. x and xi. See Small, General
 Sociology (I905), pp. 224 if.
 4 See Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation (i823), pp. I7-i8 and note.
 15 Bentley, Process of Government (igo8), pp. 2II-I2.
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 rolling, he will assume, is the characteristic of legislative tech-
 nique."6 From the point of view of the jurist, however, the
 conflict of interests is even more intense, though more subtle,
 in the actual evolution of the common law. As we shall see,
 social pressure is exerted none the less here than elsewhere.
 But the adequate sociological outlook upon law presup-
 poses an intelligent conception of social organization and the
 relationship of law and the state thereto. Now it has been
 pointed out that the community is invariably the center of
 spontaneous and voluntary common life. It may be regarded
 as the most creative factor in modern civilization.17 We are
 learning to think of a community as a complex of individuals,
 institutions, associations, and customs with the underlying
 principle expressed in the word itself, something involving
 communal features, something in common.'8 As Dewey says,
 "There is more than a verbal tie between the words common,
 community and communication."'9
 We regard society as something slightly apart from com-
 munity, namely, the social organization of the community.
 Here we find various groups or associations, both of a pur-
 posive nature, designed to achieve some definite and avowed
 end,20 and of a non-purposive nature, depending upon the con-
 dition in society in which men find themselves. In other words,
 men consciously group themselves together to attain certain
 avowed ends, and are grouped together from the point of
 view of their social activity in gaining or seeking ends. The
 grouping, it is to be noticed, in either event, is based upon
 human activity.
 18 Cf. Barnes, supra, note I1, at p. 105. See also Barnett "Legislative Log-Roll-
 ing," Oregon Law Review, VIII (I928), I4I.
 17 See Barnes, supra, note io, at p. 36, summarizing MacIver, Community: A
 Sociological Study (I924).
 "Cole, Social Theory (1920), pp. 25-26.
 19Dewey, Democracy and Education (igi6), p. 5. See also Parks and Burgess,
 Introduction to the Science of Sociology (igi8), p. 36.
 20 See Barnes, supra, note io, at p. 36.
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 The underlying principle here we can recognize as that
 of function. By function we mean the activity involved in
 gaining certain ends-the activity of one group or associa-
 tion in its relation to others, both individuals and groups.
 Thus to know the function of a group, we must first know its
 purposes."
 But in the very idea of purpose we postulate certain in-
 terests. To say that a person or group has this or that pur-
 pose, we obviously imply that the person or group has this or
 that interest. In turn the terms "function" and "purpose" ap-
 plied to groups involve a reference to some method of evalua-
 tion, as they place each group into relation both to its own
 members and to other groups and institutions of which society
 is constituted. We see at once that to criticize the social func-
 tion of a group or association it is necessary that there be some
 common standard of evaluation.22 Evaluation of ends can be
 made only with reference to consequences of the realization
 thereof. Hence, when two apparently competitive ends are
 presented, their collateral consequences must be considered.
 Thus if they can both be regarded as means to a further end,/
 their relative value can be determined. The "further end"
 thus provides the standard of evaluation. This is a process of
 elaboration. In any method of evaluation, some preferred
 end must remain tentatively unquestioned.23 Thus we refer
 them to the community in order to apprehend their relative
 significance-in other words, in order to evaluate the social
 function of the group.
 In referring the interests of the group to the community,
 there are two factors involved: first, the extent of the commu-
 nity that is affected by the interest (by which the social value
 of a given interest must depend upon the number of the indi-
 ' Cole, supra, note i8, at p. 53.
 22 Ibid., at pp. 54-55.
 '3 See Buermeyer, Cooley and others, Introduction to Reflective Thinking (1923),
 pp. 2 I8-20.
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 viduals and number of groups of the community which are
 affected thereby-in other words, the community interest will
 depend in its last analysis upon the number of "interested
 men" involved); again the social value of the interest will
 further depend upon the importance to the community of such
 interest. This will depend upon a scientific application of the
 principle of utility, within the limits of the critical judgment
 of those members of the community who have commanded the
 general respect and reputation for being best able to formu-
 late ideals of human welfare. Beyond this, it would seem im-
 possible to go.
 The common law has always protected, in a veiled way,
 the group interest. There is no exclusive individual interest.
 Men do not live in isolation. Men live in organized and un-
 organized association with others. Thus in cases in which the
 law regulates prices (for public utilities) or conditions of
 work (in industries), it is striking a balance-not between in-
 dividual interest of those who sell and those who buy certain
 commodities or the individual laborers and the individual
 owners-but between group interests of vendors and consum-
 ers and of laborers and of hirers. So in a private lawsuit be-
 tween A and B for A's trespass upon B's land, it is not A and B
 that the law regulates in their conduct with each other, but
 owners of land, as a group, and persons, forgone reason or an-
 other, trespassing thereon. Thus it is the groups that conflict,
 and it is group interests that the law deals with, balancing
 them, not upon any "fundamental principles of justice," but
 upon a seasoned and experience-based consideration of com-
 munal welfare, or social utility.
 The most insignificant suit between two petty disputants over a con-
 tract is dealt with socially on the basis of great group interests which have
 established the conditions and the bounds for it. All law is social. Every
 bit of law activity may, it is true, be stated as a sum of individual "acts";
 but every bit may also be stated in group terms, and this latter is our
 method of statement here. We do not ignore John Doe's doings, but we
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 state John Doe's doings just as they are given us, with all their social
 meanings, values, and realities.'
 Thus we might expect the law to consist of a body of ma-
 terials not at all related in a logical and consistent manner,
 but with relations determined by the principle of function.
 This as a matter of fact is exactly and precisely what we have.
 Jurists have sought from time to time for the comfort and
 satisfaction of illusory exactness and certainty. Accordingly,
 attempts have been made to develop and cultivate a legal
 order which was of such logical perfection and adequacy that
 results could be accurately and scientifically predicted in ad-
 vance. We are finding, however, that the only basis for pre-
 diction which gives any promise of satisfactory results is the
 basis of observed experiment and scientific study of the legal
 order, as a functional phase of social organization. In other
 words, we must master the law as social phenomena based
 upon sociological facts. We are learning to criticize rules of
 law on the basis of their efficacy in adjusting group interests
 by a reference to their significance to the community.
 And what is it that we mean by social interests or group
 interests as opposed to the interests of the individual constitu-
 ents of the group or community? In the first place, we must
 not impute to the groups or to the community a reality which
 does not in fact exist, nor need we impute to the community
 or the groups an existence of a metaphysical nature. We will
 not think of the state, the community, the group as existing
 in and for themselves. We will not impute to them a being or
 a mind or a will or an interest which is not there in fact. We
 will think only of the interests, the wills, the beings, and the
 existences of those who are members of the community or the
 groups.25 On the other hand, we will not make the equally
 fatal mistake of thinking of the community or the groups as
 the mere sum of their individual members in their individual
 'Bentley, Process of Government (igo8), p. 2 77.
 25 Cole, supra, note i8, at p. 22.
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 capacities. We will not think of a society as the sum of the
 individuals composing it as such. Thus we avoid the immemo-
 rial philosophical problem of the one or the many. We deny
 that we have to choose between these two equally embarrass-
 ing explanations of the existing phenomena.
 Groups and society are not composed of individuals as
 such alone nor is the community or the group explained by im-
 puting to it some real existence in a monistic system. On the
 other hand, we recognize that individuals are individuals
 when acting individually, but something different when acting
 co-operatively. Thus we distinguish between the individual
 as such and the individual when co-operating with others in a
 group. We detect a difference between the individual will
 acting independently and the will acting in conformity with
 the standards and desires of other similarly interested wills.
 Hence, we conceive of co-operating individuals or co-operat-
 ing wills as distinct from individuals. This co-operation brings
 into existence a relationship between individuals which pro-
 duces something different from a mere totality of the individ-
 ual members thereof. The results are different. Accordingly
 we repudiate both the one theory and the many theory and
 seek refuge in the equation that individuals in co-operation
 are equivalent to society-in other words, many in co-opera-
 tion produce one. This conception is helpful not only for so-
 cial theory but for ethical theory as well.26 It follows that it
 cannot be without fruit for juristic thought. Thus we may de-
 velop the notion of group desires, group needs, and group in-
 terests and group morality.
 In Queen v. Instan,27 Lord Coleridge, in a famous dictum,
 said: "It would not be correct to say that every moral obliga-
 tion involves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded in
 a moral obligation. A legal common law duty is nothing else
 26 See S. Klyce, "Fundamentals of Non-Dogmatic Ethics," International Jour-
 nal of Ethics, XXXIX (i929), 6i.
 (' (1893), i Q.B. 450.
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Thu, 26 May 2016 19:41:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 LAW IN ACTION AND SOCIAL THEORY 315
 than the enforcing by law of that which is a moral obligation
 without legal enforcement." It has been contended that this
 is inaccurate; that when the common law sometimes imposes
 liability without fault, for example, there is legal but no moral
 liability.28 But it is to be observed that even here there is
 clearly a duty arising out of morality, though not individual
 morality. When we put our emphasis upon rational29 group'
 morality rather than personal morality, we find the basis of
 the common-law rule as surely moral here as elsewhere, and
 Lord Coleridge's statement stands unimpeached. The problem
 is always whether the law ought to raise a legal duty from the
 moral duty, and this is eminently a problem of making law;
 and it is to this task that the pragmatist method of cautious
 advance from case to case is peculiarly applicable.
 The making of law now becomes a process of interpreta-
 tion on the part of the lawmakers, and primarily of the court,
 of the desires and the interests of the community. Upon a rea-
 soned and intelligent weighing of these interests will depend
 the activities of legislatures and of courts. The sociological
 standard is therefore inevitable. The lawmaker must project
 his decision into the future and anticipate its consequences
 there. If, on the whole view, a given adjustment of the con-
 flicting interests gives promise of a satisfactory and highly
 beneficial result for the community as a whole, his proposed
 decision becomes law. It is submitted that it is not too much
 to say that this is the real process behind the entire develop-
 ment of the common law. It is of no slight significance to no-
 tice that when a determined anticipation of the future conse-
 quences is proved by experience to be erroneous, the common
 law has not hesitated to retreat and strike out in a new direc-
 28 See Lefroy, "Basis of Case Law," Law Quarterly Review, XXII (igo6), 293,
 297, note 2; ibid., p. 303.
 29 distinguished from the half-conscious motive arising from mere life in so-
 ciety, e.g., custom, folk ways, etc., see Dewey and Tufts, Ethics (I908), p. 38 and
 chap. iv.
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 tion."0 The legal decision, then, becomes nothing more or
 less than a hypothesis.8' It is based upon a science of proba-
 bilities as to consequences.
 Thus we substitute for an abstract notion of ideal justice
 an empiric and pragmatic view of the future. It is possible,
 then, to form a fairly accurate conception of justice by desig-
 nating it as a "sociological probability." Thus, just as phys-
 ics is beginning to view the material universe as consisting
 primarily of "statistical probabilities," the pragmatist jurist
 will view justice as a sociological approximation of what will
 be necessary to make law square with future experience in
 view of the standards and criteria of life as he knows it.
 Hence, we claim no quality of universality for justice. We
 concede it to be nothing more than a hypothesis, in other
 words, a sociological probability.32
 In the same spirit of realism, how are we to regard the
 law? It has been said by eminent jurists that the law as we
 know it at any given time can be nothing more than a proph-
 ecy of what a court of justice will in fact do under a given set
 of circumstances.3" We will then think of law as merely a pre-
 diction of what interpretation a court will place upon the facts
 of experience as they apply to the given conflict of interests.
 We have then, it is to be observed, a working conception of
 law, which can be described by nothing so well as a "juridical
 probability."
 From our present viewpoint, then, we may regard the law
 as nothing more than a "juridical probability," the purpose
 of which is to adjust the conflicting interests which contin-
 ually press for recognition and protection in accordance with
 the "sociological probabilities" of the consequences of this or
 "Pound, "Courts and Legislation," Science of Legal Method (I92I), p. 2I4.
 This thought is developed somewhat more elaborately in my article, "Some
 Implications of Juristic Pragmatism," International Journal of Ethics, XXXIX
 (I929), 269.
 32 Cardozo, Growth of the Law (I924), pp. 68 ff.
 88 Ibid., p. 52.
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 that rule of law. With this notion of law and justice, we have
 machinery competent to cope with the problem as presented
 in the light of a scientific social theory. It is now submitted
 that there is available an explanation of existing social phe-
 nomena which squares with all the facts of experience as we
 know them in the legal order. We will have occasion to look
 into several branches of the common law to see if we can de-
 tect the working of the principles as explained and described
 here. We need not concern ourselves with the purported rea-
 sons given by the courts, except in so far as these reasons ex-
 plain a deeper pressure behind. Rationalization of conduct
 will depend largely upon the manner and method of the think-
 ing of the times. An objective view and a study made from
 the vantage point of time and apart from immediate environ-
 mental influences may reveal the deeper sources from which
 the common law has emerged.
 III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "SCIENCE" OF LAW
 Consider the technique of the common law. How loath
 have the judges been to lay down general rules for the govern-
 ment of concrete cases in the future! J. Maule, in M'Naghe-
 tn's case,34 said that he
 felt a great difficulty in answering certain questions submitted to the
 court; first, because they were not put with reference to a particular case
 which might explain or limit the generality of their terms; secondly, be-
 cause no argument had been heard upon them; and, thirdly, because of a
 fear that the answers might embarrass the administration of justice when
 they might be cited in criminal trials.35
 We shall consider the development of certain rules of law,
 together with deviations from their logical implications, as the
 pressure of social interests has been felt. The rule of the crimi-
 nal law developed that consent to the taking was defense to
 larceny.36 But where it was necessary to entrap the criminal
 34 io Clark & F. 200.
 s" Cf. Pound, "Foreword to Magna Carta," Oregon Law Review, VIII (I929), 6i.
 3s See MacDaniel's Case, Fost. C.L. 121, i68 Engl. Repr. 6o.
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 and the defendant did not know of the assent, it was held to be
 a crime."7 Here the judges tried to employ logic to rationalize
 the situation and find the assent "unreal." The truth was that
 the assent was quite real and the case is illogical in view of the
 current conception of larceny. The judges, however, knew
 that any other rule would not work, that it might embarrass
 the administration of criminal justice in the future. In other
 words, as the pragmatist would say, they were looking to the
 consequences in the future. Observe also the rule that consent
 is no defense in prosecution for assault, although it is a defense
 to an action in tort for the same acts.38 The reason is that ex-
 perience has shown the better rule for each situation and, as
 Justice Holmes has said, the life of the law is experience rather
 than logic.
 Again, it is a commonplace of criminal law that while in-
 toxication in general is no excuse for crime, yet it will be a de-
 fense if one is so drunk that he is incapable of entertaining
 the specific intent that some crimes require." But when it
 came about in specific cases that drunken persons stabbed
 others to death or nearly so, it was laid down that drunken-
 ness could not affect the question of malicious intent when de-
 fendant had used a dangerous instrument.4 It was felt that
 the defendant ought to be punished and for practical pur-
 poses; he had the necessary intent.
 The courts have purported to assume that the burden of
 proof in insanity cases must be deduced from "fundamental
 premises" of criminal law. Thus the presumption of innocence
 as a premise has given rise to a brood of monsters in the form
 of absurd decisions amounting in actual practice to raising
 a presumption of insanity whenever the accused raises the
 T Eggington's Case, 2 East. P.C. 666.
 a Cf. Commonwealth v. Collberg, iig Mass. 350, with Galbrath v. Fleiming, 6o
 Mich. 405. See Bohlen, Studies in Torts (I927), p. 577.
 3 People v. Jones, 263 III. 564.
 4 Rex v. Meakin, 7 Carrington & Payne. 297.
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 issue.4" Other courts have changed premises and by employ-
 ing logic instrumentally have followed quite as satisfactory a
 process of reasoning to arrive at a fundamentally opposite but
 infinitely more valuable result.42
 Professor Holdsworth has shown how the logic of the
 conception of a corporation dictated certain deductions to
 Blackstone for very good "reasons," but expediency, the de-
 sires of the community, the social mind, convenience-in
 short, justice, or, if you please, social adjustment, has pro-
 duced opposite results in law. "Practical convenience," says
 Holdsworth, "rather than theoretical considerations have
 from the days of the Year Books onward determined what ac-
 tivities are possible and what are impossible to a corpora-
 tion.43
 Accordingly, the corporation, though mindless, may com-
 mit crime; though soulless, it may entertain not only the mens
 rea44 but a specific intent.45 "The real problem," says Laski,46
 "is simply whether we dare afford to lose such hold as we pos-
 sess over the action of groups in the affairs of social life-the
 more particularly in an age predominantly associational in
 character."
 Now in considering how the law protects these various so-
 cial interests, it frequently, if not invariably, happens that the
 social interests involved are overlapping and conflicting. Sel-
 dom, if ever, is it merely a case of giving or withholding a
 given protection for a given social interest. Out of life grows
 41 A note in Oregon Law Review, VIII (1929), 190, contains many authorities.
 4 See State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 58 Atl. 905.
 4 See Holdsworth, History of English Law, v. iX, 51-52, quoted by Cardozo,
 Paradoxes of Legal Science, pp. 65-66.
 4Regina v. Panton, I4 Vic. L. Rep. 836 (Austr.).
 '5See Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294. Cf. Reed v.
 Bank, 130 Mass. 443, in which a corporation was held civilly liable for malicious pros-
 ecution.
 ' Laski, "Basis of Vicarious Liability," Foundations of Sovereignty and Other
 Essays, pp. 250, 289.
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 the inevitable conflict of interests, and it is to these conflict-
 ing interests that the law is applied as an agency for balanc-
 ing and weighing and determining just how far this social
 interest will be protected at the expense of that interest. Ideal-
 ly, of course, the object is to protect as many interests as pos-
 sible at the least sacrifice of the totality of social interests in-
 volved in the conflict.47
 It is further obvious that the intensity of the pressure of
 these social interests will vary under an infinite variety of cir-
 cumstances, conditions, and situations. Thus it is difficult, if
 not impossible, for the law to work out a scheme of protec-
 tion which defines and delimits the exact boundary within
 which any given social interest (hence, such individual inter-
 ests as may be referred to it) will be protected. Much more
 satisfactorily can the law develop certain principles-that is,
 generalized hypotheses or assumptions of protection-and
 standards-that is, methods for determining the application
 of these principles in concrete cases, as they arise. In this way
 the body of what we know as the common law has developed.
 Thus it is that the common law has consisted of a body of ma-
 terials not the least important of which is the technique of
 procedure to be applied by a learned and trained profession.48
 The common law, from the very beginning, soon devel-
 oped a technique which allowed for the expanding and shrink-
 ing of rules of law to lend effective protection to conflicting
 interests. In the early stages, frequent development of a legal
 principle upon the grounds of "convenience" are noticed.49
 This fule could not apply or that one was not to prevail be-
 cause it would be "inconvenient." Littleton declared that
 "the law will sooner suffer a mischief than an inconvenience,"
 'Pound, "Theory of Social Interests," Publications American Sociological So-
 ciety, XV (I920), I5.
 4 Pound, "Law of the Land," Dakota Law Review, I (I92 I), 09.
 'Winfield, "Public Policy and English Common Law," Harvard Law Review,
 XLII (I928), 76, 8o.
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 by which he is to be understood as implying that individual
 rights are not to prevail over the social good, although he
 doubtless knew not that he meant it. As Professor Winfield
 has said:
 Now Littleton was very much the child of his age, and these phrases
 "inconvenient" and "against reason" are of common occurrence in the
 Year Books. The whole of that era was one of rapid building of our law,
 and it had to be developed more by analogies, by logic, and by a broad
 perception of what was wanted than by precedents of which there were
 few compared to the mass that exists in more modern law. I doubt
 whether Littleton identified "inconvenience" and "against reason" with
 what we now call public policy. . . . . But very likely Coke in his writ-
 ings and reports turned what he borrowed from Littleton into something a
 little more technical and certainly more farreaching-something which
 formed the substance of public policy for later generations to shape.
 50
 The learned author again says:
 If one can extract any meaning from him [Coke], it seems to be that
 the law prefers the public good to private good, and that if it has to choose
 between prejudice to the many and mischief peculiar to individuals, the
 Individual must suffer.51
 Writers have admitted that the development of the com-
 mon law has depended largely upon the cautious feeling of
 the public pulse, i.e., upon the judge's notion of what is con-
 ducive to the welfare of the community in view of the mores
 of the times, when new cases were presented. It is suggested
 at least by implication, however, that this is the course of evo-
 lution "unless the same point has been formally decided."52
 "Where there is no governing precedent, direct or indirect,
 justice and other principles of right and wrong, the fitness of
 things, convenience, and policy, make case-law."53 It is sub-
 mitted that this proposition becomes more accurate and more
 50 Ibid., pp. 76, 8i. Ibid., pp. 76, 82.
 52 Cf. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence (5th ed.), p. 634. Cf. also Lefroy, "Basis
 of Case Law," Law Quarterly Review, XXII (iqo6), 293-94.
 " Lefroy, supra, note 52, at p. 295.
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 nearly represents the explanation of the growth of the com-
 mon law without the qualification. The effect of precedent, of
 course, is not to be minimized, but the deeper principle in-
 volved is that precedent has been followed to achieve certain-
 ty and uniformity only when these ends were evaluated higher
 than other social interests.54
 It is not the following of precedent, merely as such, that
 makes the common law or that lends continuity to the de-
 veloped body of legal materials which we think of as the law
 of the land, nor is it any persistent universality of any of
 our fundamental dogmas. Scarcely any of the broad princi-
 ples of the Year Books are to be found in recognized form in
 the modern reports. Pound says,
 More important, however, is the frame of mind that lies behind this
 traditional technique of the common-law lawyer. It is a frame of mind
 which looks at things in the concrete, not in the abstract; which puts its
 faith in experience rather than in abstractions. It is a frame of mind which
 prefers to go forward cautiously on the basis of experience from this case
 or that case to the next case, as justice in each case seems to require, in-
 stead of trying to refer everything back to supposed universals.55
 As the body of legal materials accumulates, however, and
 the practice of looking to judicial experience and custom takes
 stronger hold, rules, worked out for concrete cases and types
 of cases, have a natural tendency to extend themselves, both
 by stare decisis and by analogy.- But with slight variations
 in facts and circumstances, when a different social interest
 makes itself felt, or presses more intensely for recognition and
 protection, so an "exception" is made to the "general rule,"
 or perhaps a "fiction" will be employed which affords the de-
 sired protection to the new social interest or to the one which
 exerts the added pressure. In this manner, the "science" of
 law develops, using science in the sense of the analytical ju-
 rist, and the new social interest makes its appearance in the
 body of law in the form of a "reason" for the exception or the
 M Cf. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process (I92 I), pp. I5I if.
 5 Op. cit., p. 109.
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 fiction. Thus we acquire the paraphernalia of science and
 categories, classifications and rules are developed.
 An example or two will suffice to illustrate. Let us con-
 sider one of the best known of the general rules of the law of
 agency. It is commonly said that the law imputes to the prin-
 cipal and charges him with all notice or knowledge relating to
 the subject matter of the agency which the agent acquires or
 obtains while acting within the scope of the agency.56 It is
 sometimes said that the reason for this rule is that there is a
 reasonable inference that the agent will impart the informa-
 tion to his principal.57 However, it is worth while noticing
 that the law "conclusively presumes" that such knowledge
 has been imparted from the agent to the principal,58 which
 suggests that, whatever might have been the original ration-
 ale of the rule, it no longer depends upon such reasoning. It
 is said that it is required by a sound public policy.59 Here pub-
 lic policy is another name for the social interest in the general
 business morals. A sound commercial policy requires that
 business be carried on upon such a basis. Thus it is in these
 cases that it is immaterial whether the agent has actually im-
 parted such information to the principal or not.
 As well settled as this rule is, it is equally well settled that
 when the agent is acting adversely to the principal, the rule
 does not apply.60 Some of the courts argue speciously that in-
 asmuch as the original rule was based upon the duty that the
 agent owed to tell his principal and the corresponding pre-
 M Kennedy v. Green, 3 Mylne & Keen. 699.
 57 See The Distilled Spirits, ii Wall. 356, 367.
 58Dresser v. Norwood, 17 C.B. (n.s.) 466.
 Cf. Mechem, "Notice to or Knowledge of an Agent," Michigan Law Review,
 VII (igo8), 113, quoting from Kennedy v. Green, 3 Mylne & Keen 699: "Policy and
 safety of the public forbids a person to deny knowledge while he is so dealing as to
 keep himself ignorant, and yet all the while let his agents know, and himself perhaps
 profit by that knowledge. In such a case it would be most iniquitous and most dan-
 gerous to give shelter and encouragement to all kinds of fraud, were the law not to
 consider the knowledge of one as common to both, whether it be so in fact or not."
 6 Innerarity v. Bank, 139 Mass. 332, i N.E. 282.
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 sumption that he would so tell him, the rule should not apply
 when the agent acting adversely to the principal, could not
 be expected to impart such knowledge to the principal.' This,
 however, will not do. It was a sound public policy, the social
 interest in the general morals and business ethics and the de-
 sire to encourage commerce, that caused the original rule to
 be adopted. The need for such protection is obviously want-
 ing when the agent acts adversely to his principal. Another
 reason is sometimes given here, that inasmuch as the pre-
 tended agent is really acting on his own account, since ad-
 versely to his principal, he is not acting within the scope of
 his authority.62 The fallacy here is so elementary as not to
 need' discussion. Other varieties of the same proposition are
 sometimes given to account for the exception. The real reason
 back of the exception is that the change in factual circum-
 stances has changed the intensity of the competing social in-
 terest. Now it is thought that it is not necessary to hold the
 principal for the protection of commerce, or perhaps it is
 thought that commerce as a whole would be encouraged more
 by allowing men to deal through agents without attaching
 such a high degree of liability.
 Again, there is an exception even to this exception, for
 when, in spite of the fact that the agent was acting adversely
 to his principle, it is necessary for the principal to trace his
 claim exclusively through the "tainted source" it is held that
 he is bound by the agent's knowledge." The legal reason giv-
 en here is that if the principal cares to ratify and indorse the
 acts of the agent, he cannot accept the advantages without
 also assuming the burden which makes him liable for the
 fraud.64 But this is not so much a legal reason as a moral one,
 61 See Innerarity v. Bank, supra, note 6o.
 62 See In re Plankington Bank, 87 Wis. 378, 58 N.W. 784. See Mechem, supra,
 note 59, at p. I29-30.
 " See Bank v. New Milford, 36 Conn. 93.
 " In many of these cases it is frankly recognized that the rules themselves are
 illogical enough, but that the general "social policy" demands the results. Cf. J. Stone,
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 and the social interest is so patent as easily to account for the
 deviation. The significant thing is to notice how when one so-
 cial interest presses harder the logic of the law gives way to
 allow the necessary and desired protection, thus establishing
 an exception to the logical rule. The legal "reason" for the
 rules and exceptions invariably mask beneath their specious
 plausibility the real dominating nature of the social interest
 responsible for the rule.
 Again, the principle of respondent superior has raised se-
 rious problems for legal logic. It is well settled that a master
 is liable for the torts of his servants if committed in the line of
 their service, although unauthorized and perhaps actually
 prohibited-and even when colored with the actual personal
 malevolence of the servant. Vicarious liability is firmly es-
 tablished in the common law, and while attempts have been
 made to explain it on the fiction of "implied authority"-an
 irrational doctrine or the equally fictitious doctrine of iden-
 tity of legal personality, we still want a satisfactory account
 for the phenomenon. Fictions may describe, but they do not
 account for results. Why do we have the fiction? It is quite
 clear. Because we needed it to fit the law and conduct to the
 facts of life.65 And when the logical implications of the fic-
 tion prove inadequate to the present economic and social or-
 der, courts must ignore such a priori limitations and push for.
 ward to results which meet the demands of communal life.66
 To look to the same branch of the law for another illustra-
 tion, consider the case of Pickering v. Busk.67 This is a lead-
 ing case involving the general rule that when a} principal has
 justifying the results in Gleason v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. i6i-62:
 "Undoubtedly formal logic may find something to criticize in a rule which puts in the
 principal liability for the acts of his agent done without the principal's knowledge or
 consent and to which his own negligence has not contributed, but few doctrines of
 the law are more firmly established or more in harmony with accepted notions of
 social policy than that of the liability of the principal without fault of his own."
 65 See Laski, "Basis of Vicarious Liability," supra, note 46, at pp. 2 72-73.
 " Ibid., pp. 290-9I. 07 I5 East 38.
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 acted in such a way as to produce a situation which would
 ordinarily be calculated to lead the average prudent man to
 believe that another is the owner of personal property and a
 third person acts upon such belief the principal will subse-
 quently be estopped from denying the ownership. The act
 constituting the estoppel in Pickering v. Busk was allowing
 the agent to have possession of personal property. Mere pos-
 session alone, however, is not enough to estop the true owner
 from asserting his title. In Pickering v. Busk the agent was
 one who ordinarily sold his own property; subsequently, the
 rule of the case is that when the possession of personal prop-
 erty is intrusted to one whose ordinary business it is to sell
 for himself or another such property, third parties will be jus-
 tified in relying upon that person's apparent ownership.08
 In Levi v. Booth,69 the owner of a diamond had intrusted
 the 'same to an itinerant vendor of diamonds with the author-
 ity to get an offer for the diamond. The agent, however, dis-
 posed of the same as his own, and subsequently the real owner
 was allowed to recover the ring from the bona fide purchaser.
 Here the rule is apparently conflicting with the decision in
 Pickering v. Busk. How, then, may the divergence be ac-
 counted for? In both cases the agents were dealers. In both
 cases they were intrusted with possession. In both cases the
 third party dealt with the agent relying upon his apparent
 ownership of the property. The cases are usually treated as
 being contradictory. They are, however, quite satisfactory.
 If we look to the real consideration behind Pickering v. Busk,
 it is observed to be the social interest involved in promoting
 trade and encouraging commerce. It is highly desirable that
 the public be entitled to rely upon the possession of personal
 property by regular dealers as cutting off any rights of undis-
 closed principals. Accordingly, it may very well be that a
 "sound public policy" will demand the protection of those
 68 Mechens on Agency (2d ed.), Sec. 2 II 2.
 69 58 Md. 305, 42 Am. Rep. 332.
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 who deal with regular merchants on such a basis. The prop-
 erty rights of the true owner are invaded for the sake of the
 social interest involved. In the case of Levi v. Booth, how-
 ever, it may very well be that the law is not willing to sacrifice
 the property rights of the innocent principal when the protec-
 tion to commerce takes the form of insuring those who deal
 with itinerant vendors. It is not necessary for a sound public
 policy to inspire confidence in such commercial enterprises.
 When, however, instead of an itinerant vendor of jewelry, the
 agent is apparently a reputable business institution engaged
 in the ordinary retail trade in jewelry, the result is different.70
 Thus we find another exception to a general logical rule, the
 only reason for which is the varying intensity of the compet-
 ing social interests involved. In these cases the law protects
 first the social interest in encouraging trade and commerce,
 and, upon a slightly changing set of facts, it will afford its pro-
 tection to the social interest in individual life and property.
 Again, nothing is better settled in the law of contracts
 than the proposition that when A and B contract, A's promise
 to B can be enforced by no one but B, the promisee.7" This
 was the general rule at the common law, and yet it was equal-
 ly well settled that if B were acting as agent for the undis,
 closed principal the principal could subsequently enforce this
 promise against A by a suit in his own name.72 Likewise, if A
 were acting as agent for an undisclosed principal, his princi-
 pal could enforce B's promise by suing the latter's principal
 in his own name.73 The common law got around the inconsis-
 tency by the fiction of agency. The fiction here becomes the
 premise for the ingenious result. The undisclosed principal
 can sue and be sued because the mind of the agent is the mind
 70 Smith V. Clews, I05 N.Y. 283.
 71 See Anson on Contracts (8th ed.), p. 275.
 7 Ford v. Williams, 2i How. 287.
 7Mechem on Agency (2d ed.), sec. I73I.
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 of the principal. Accordingly, the agent's contract is the prin-
 cipal's contract.74
 The real truth of the whole matter is that here were in
 competition opposing social interests. The social interest in
 individual life and freedom of trade and contract is disguised
 in the general principle of the common law that a man may
 choose with whom he will enter into contractual relations.
 This was responsible for the original rule that only parties to
 the contract could sue. On the other hand, a wise and just
 "public policy" demanded that the party enjoying the bene-
 fits of a contract be compelled to assume its burdens. To make
 the situation fair all around, it was necessary to allow such
 party his action in his own name to enforce his rights. Thus,
 as variations in factual situations raised new social interests
 to be protected, the consistency of the common law is retained
 only by the use of a fiction.
 To illustrate again how inexact the logic of law becomes
 when the pressure of social interests is strong enough, let us
 again go to the law of agency to consider the case of an action
 brought against an undisclosed principal upon an act or con-
 tract which was expressly prohibited by the principal. It is
 now firmly established that such an action may be maintained
 and a recovery allowed in all cases when if the agency had
 been disclosed there would have been a recovery on the
 grounds of apparent authority.75 There is no logical explana-
 tion for the rule. There cannot be an implied authority be-
 cause the principal has expressly prohibited the acts of the
 agent. It is equally clear that there can be no estoppel be-
 cause the third party was in no sense misled, the fact of agen-
 cy being at the time undisclosed. It cannot be said that he
 "relied" upon the "agent's" authority, as he knew of no agen-
 cy. The rule has been severely criticized on the ground of its
 "See Holmes, "History of Agency," Harvard Law Review, IV (i89i), 345.
 " Watteau v. Fenwick (i893), I Q.B. 346; Hubbard v. Tenbrook, I24 Pa. St.
 29I, i6 Atl. 8i7.
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 fallacious logic.76 Purported explanations of the rule are us-
 ually quite as illogical as the rule itself or clear examples of
 question begging.77 From our present point of view, however,
 it is not difficult to find the answer. The cases are thoroughly
 sound. They are to be regarded simply as exceptions to the
 general rule. The law here is not only justifiable, but in fact
 highly desirable. It will not do to have the contrary rule. An
 unscrupulous principal has too many chances for success.
 First, he may never be discovered; second, if he is discovered
 he can allege secret limitations, and usually there is not one
 to gainsay him. The rule is indispensable to prevent fraud.
 The social interest in the general morals and a sound commer-
 cial policy will not tolerate anything different. If there is
 hardship upon the principal, it is largely of his own doing, and
 in any event it is by far the lesser of two evils. But here,
 again, the science of law suffers in its logical consistency and
 the general scheme is cluttered with another exception and
 all because of the intensity of the pressure of certain social
 interests.78
 It is thus seen that in the working out even of the minut-
 est details of the common law, the soundness of the results
 have been tested by principles of expediency and practicabil-
 ity that will fit only into a social theory that acounts for social
 phenomena as the result of group actions and interactions
 upon a basis of the social interest involved. The emphasis, in
 both empirical and rational social science, is thus put upon the
 principle of function with the close observation and adher-
 ence to facts and experience which is necessarily implied. But
 more of this at another time.
 INDIANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
 7 See note in Columbia Law Review, X (i910), 763.
 7TMechem on Agency (2d ed.), sec. i768.
 " Cf. note in Harvard Law Review, XLII (I929), 685, and Seavey "Rationale
 of Agency," Yale Law Journal, XXIX (I920), 859, 883 if.
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